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RECALLING T.R. POWELL'S COURSE
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Victor H. Kramer*
After accepting the preceding article by Professor Braemer for
publication, we learned that a colleague of ours had been a student of
Powell's. He graciously agreed to share his memories of Powell's
c/asses.-The Editors
In my senior year at Harvard College (1934-35) I audited Professor Thomas Reed Powell's third-year course in Constitutional
Law given in Austin Hall at the Law School. There were approximately 150 to 200 law students in the class which met twice a week
for both semesters. I was not formally enrolled as an auditor but
simply sat in on almost all the classes. No one questioned my presence. I do not recall that any other undergraduates audited the
course that year.
Professor Powell, then fifty-five years old, sat at his desk in the
middle of the teacher's platform, wearing horn-rimmed glasses and
looking somewhat owl-like. Virtually all the talking in the class
consisted of a dialogue between Professor Powell and two third-year
students. One of these students became a clerk to Justice Frankfurter and ultimately a famous liberal Washington lawyer. His
name was Joseph Raub. The other student in 1950 was appointed
United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York. He
had a distinguished name: it was Cornelius Wickersham, Jr. Wickersham's views as a student of constitutional law were as far to the
right as Raub's views were to the left. The fact that Raub had a
sparkling sense of humor and that Wickersham did not, contributed
to the fascinating, not to say exciting quality of many of the classroom discussions. Powell seized on the preconceptions, temperaments and high intelligence of these two students and called on
them to answer his questions so that each student's views played off
against the other's. In this manner, Powell revealed the major
premises of constitutional law that were prevalent at the time.
It was a joy even for a non-law student to attend these classes
in this year-long course when Powell's flashing, cynical witticisms
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punctuated his trialogue with Rauh and Wickersham. This was the
era in which some legislatures required teachers to take an oath to
support the Constitution and some teachers attacked the legislation
as unconstitutional. Powell cracked: "I have no objection to taking
an oath to support the Constitution; after all, it has supported me
all my life."
But to the contemporary law professor, the most remarkable
aspect of Powell's course was that it covered only the commerce
clause and some aspects of the due process clauses. I do not recall
that the class overtly discussed any other part of constitutional law.
Moreover, the discussion centered around only one or two cases:
Hammer v. Dagenhart', and (much more briefly) Adkins v. Children's Hospital.2 If a student in the class learned about the substantive aspects of any other part of constitutional law, he (there were
no women at Harvard Law at that time) would have had to read the
book assigned for the course on his own. That book was compiled
by Professor James Parker Hall, Dean of the University of Chicago
Law School. The book was in the American Casebook Series and
covered almost 1900 pages. Students used the 1913 edition enlarged
by a 1926 Supplement bound into the 1913 edition. (Constitutional
law was slower to change in those days.) The two cases on which
Powell dwelt were in the Supplement. It is interesting that, with
regard to Adkins v. Children's Hospital (decided in 1923), Professor
Hall suggested that it be considered immediately following the famous Lochner case3 (decided in 1905) while Hammer v. Dagenhart
(decided in 1918) should be taken up right after McCray v. United
States,4 decided in 1904 and long since forgotten.
I cannot explain how the sixty hours in that course slid by
when only two cases were considered in depth. But the Powell
method of speaking can be described. He had a rapier-like thrust of
mind, exhibited sometimes in long, rolling, Macauley-like sentences
and sometimes in the form of phrases meant to pierce the pontification in a Court opinion. One example from his writings conveys the
essence. It is from an address given to the North Carolina Bar Associations in August 1935, about three months after the end of the
class, and concerns a small portion of Mr. Justice Roberts's opinion
in the Railway Pension case. 6
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
(1935).
6.

247 u.s. 251 (1918).
261 u.s. 525 (1923).
198 u.s. 45 (1905).
195 u.s. 27 (1904).
Powell, Some Aspects of Constitutionalism and Federalism, 14 N.C.L. REV. I
Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
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"Our duty, like that of the court below, is fairly to construe the powers of
Congress, and to ascertain whether or not the enactment falls within them, uninfluenced by predilection for or against the policy disclosed in the legislation. The fact
that the compulsory scheme is novel is, of course, no evidence of unconstitutionality. Even should we consider the Act unwise and prejudicial to both public and
private interest, if it be fairly within delegated power our obligation is to sustain it.
On the other hand, though we should think the measure embodies a valuable social
plan and be in entire sympathy with its purpose and intended results, if the provisions go beyond the boundaries of constitutional power we must so declare. 7..
Behold these nine automatons, with minds swept free of every human frailty
and every human preference, with no interest in the income of carriers or the wellbeing of those whose hands are on the throttle and whose eyes are on the track, with
no notions of public policy, behold them reading the Constitution with some
mechanical instruments of vision and of understanding and finding there between
the lines or beneath the words of 1787 and 1789 the answers to the questions of
1935!8

You did not come away from Powell's course with any system
of values for deciding constitutional questions. Indeed, Frankfurter
has said that Powell often told him that he (Frankfurter) furnished
the students' minds after Powell cleared them of rubbish.9 And so,
week after week of engaging Raub and Wickersham in debate allowed Powell to destroy the premises and lack of logic in virtually
every sentence of the two opinions on which he concentrated.
Joe Raub has since told me that he recalls Powell had predicted that the Supreme Court was going to uphold the constitutionality of the NRA in the Schechter case. On May 27, 1935, the
Court decided that the NRA was unconstitutional.w That was
either the day before or the day after the final exam in the course
but today neither of us recalls which it was.

7. /d. at 346.
8. Powell, supra note 5, at 9.
9. F. FRANKFURTER, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 292 (1960); see a/so Frankfurter, Thomas Reed Powell, 69 HARV. L. REV. 797 (1956), reprinted in F. FRANKFURTER,
OF LAW AND MEN 258 (P. Elman ed. !956).
10. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).

